terça-feira, fevereiro 17, 2004
China: a próxima crise asiática
Um artigo na TechCentralStation aponta o perigo de uma grave recessão na Ásia causada pelo colapso da Economia chinesa.
Recent analysts draw parallels with conditions in China today and the situation in Asia on the eve of the currency crisis. Some saw the collapses in Southeast Asia as a classic property boom and bust. China certainly looks like that. Donald Straszheim, an independent economist who is generally bullish on China, sees parallels with the Japanese system, where politically-influenced loans led to over-spending on infrastructure projects: "China's financial system is heading for a Japan-style quagmire."
The difference between Japan and the Asian currency crisis economies was that Japan had vast savings to dip into. Rather than crash, it ground to halt. China has savings, but how do they compare to the debt, how much debt is there and has it got the system to manage a crash?
Andy Rothman, China strategist at CLSA identifies the primary problem as misallocation of resources. "Five years after it began steps to recapitalise its state banking system, China still suffers from an increasing stock of non-performing loans, widespread capital misallocation and manifold structural inefficiencies" Rothman said.
Few economists think a financial meltdown is imminent, but all are warning about the level of debt. We have to remember one thing about economists. They generally get it right, but can never tell us the timing. All, however, recognize what the impact of financial failure in China could be on the world economy.
China has become an important contributor to global growth, the major global consumer of commodities, a prop economy for much of the rest of Asia and an important source of earnings for major global corporations. We got a small taste of the impact of economic correction a decade ago.
In 1993 the Chinese government slammed the brakes on growth to stifle inflation, creating a sharp drop in both economic activity and demand for products from abroad. Steel imports, for example, fell to 22.8 million tons in 1994 from 33.5 million tons in 1993. The stakes today are far higher. Morgan Stanley has predicted that even if Chinese growth were to slow to 8%, commodity prices could fall by 15%. Imagine the impact of a full scale recession.
China has not had the normal cycle of growth and recession. Desperate to maintain growth to generate jobs, China's leadership has managed the economy to keep growth. We know its instruments of control are crude. The financial system is weak. The challenges facing the Chinese leadership would defeat most politicians in most countries. They are good, but they would have to be miracle workers to prevent a crash
As causas da (previsível) recessão chinesa encontram-se (mais uma vez) no excesso de intervencionismo estatal. Quando esta suceder iremos ter a mesma miriade de articulistas a discorrer novamente sobre o "fracasso do neoliberlismo". Estarão errados mais uma vez.
posted by Miguel Noronha 3:07 da tarde
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